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Abstract
This paper proposes a discrete mixture model which assigns individuals, up to a probability, to
either a class of random utility (RU) maximizers or a class of random regret (RR) minimizers, on
the basis of their sequence of observed choices. Our proposed model advances the state of the
art of RU-RR mixture models by i) adding and simultaneously estimating a membership model
which predicts the probability of belonging to a RU or RR class; ii) adding a layer of random
taste heterogeneity within each behavioural class; and iii) deriving a welfare measure associated
with the RU-RR mixture model and consistent with referendum-voting, which is the adequate
mechanism of provision for such local public goods. The context of our empirical application is a
stated choice experiment concerning traffic calming schemes. We find that the random parameter
RU-RR mixture model not only outperforms its fixed coefficient counterpart in terms of fit—as
expected—but also in terms of plausibility of membership determinants of behavioural class. In
line with psychological theories of regret, we find that, compared to respondents who are familiar
with the choice context (i.e. the traffic calming scheme), unfamiliar respondents are more likely
to be regret minimizers than utility maximizers.
Keywords: Random Regret Minimization, Random Utility Maximization, Discrete choice
experiment, Latent classes, Traffic calming schemes
Preprint submitted to Transportation Research Part A January 12, 2014
Research Highlights:
• We estimate a behavioural latent class comparing two choice paradigms (RR and RU).
• We explore the determinants of being best described by RR or RU choice behaviour.
• We derive adequate welfare estimates for this context of mixed choice behaviours.
• We associate familiarity with the choice context with utility maximization.
• Respondents unfamiliar with the choice context are likely to adopt regret minimization.
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1. Introduction1
As the common place saying goes, a glass holding some wine can be perceived—depending2
on the perspective of the onlooker—either as partly ‘empty’ or as partly ‘full’. The potential con-3
sequences of these subjective and different views of reality may well extend to choice behaviour.4
Such consequences, however, tend to be systematically under-investigated. Especially so in em-5
pirical studies based on discrete choice models where the well-established paradigm of random6
utility (RU) maximization dominates. This paper moves from the premises that both the above7
views can be argued to underlie the rationale for deliberative choice. As a practical consequence,8
they both should be systematically accommodated in empirical analysis of choice outcomes.9
A decision-maker who is inclined to see the glass partly ‘empty’ might be more inclined to fo-10
cus on regret minimization, rather than focussing on utility maximization. Therefore, when a series11
of alternatives are evaluated by a subject with such a behavioural inclination, some evidence of12
this regret minimizing behaviour should be detectable in the sequence of observed choices. Regret13
minimization leads to a systematically different pattern of choices from those made by subjects14
who strictly comply with the received view of utility maximization in their choice behaviour.15
Beyond pessimism, there may be many other reasons that may induce decision makers to en-16
gage in regret minimization, including having achieved an already satisfactory level of utility as17
provided by the status quo after a long and costly search. This would be a ‘satisficing’ approach18
that might be attractive to those who wish to avoid the risk of change or the search cost involved19
in a new choice. So, extreme risk aversion or perception of unusually high information search cost20
can also motivate random regret (RR). Further examples include those who feel their choices will21
be judged by others with potentially different values. Or those who feel that vulnerable depen-22
dents, such as young children or elderly, might suffer as a consequence of their decision-making23
(Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007). All such subjects may be more inclined to choose trying to mini-24
mize expected regret, rather than to seek utility maximization.25
Regardless of the motivating factors, the availability of empirically tractable models of RR26
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choice behaviour is desirable to practitioners. Recent work by Chorus (2010) provide analysts27
with exactly such a category of choice models, conveniently framed around the popular logit spec-28
ification for the computation of choice probabilities. Given the availability of empirically tractable29
minimum regret models of discrete choice, in this paper we investigate the implications of simul-30
taneously modelling two mutually exclusive rationales for choice behaviour: (i) the standard RU31
maximization and (ii) the much more seldom employed RR minimization. That is, we hypothesize32
that while the sequence of choices made by some decision-makers are more likely to result from33
regret minimization behaviour, those made by others are instead more likely to result from utility34
maximization behaviour.35
Such heterogeneity in choice behaviour is modelled by assuming the existence of two be-36
haviourally different latent classes, one including regret minimizers and the other utility maximiz-37
ers. This gives rise to a probabilistic decision process similar in form to the conventional panel38
latent class (LC) models for discrete preference heterogeneity. In our model, instead classes de-39
scribe specific decision paradigms or heuristics. Analogous approaches based on behaviourally40
separate Latent classes have been used by others (Scarpa et al., 2009; Hensher and Greene, 2010;41
Hess et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 2012) and are collectively called probabilistic decision processes42
(PDPs).43
By doing so our study moves away from the conventional, and behaviourally quite restrictive,44
assumption that only one of the two paradigms (utility or regret) would be the best representation45
for all choices observed in the sample (e.g., Chorus et al., 2011; Hensher et al., 2013; Chorus, 2012;46
Thiene et al., 2012; Boeri et al., 2012a,b; Chorus and Bierlaire, 2013; Kaplan and Prato, 2012).47
Furthermore, we make three novel contributions compared to a recent similar study by Hess et al.48
(2012), which is the only other study we know of that accommodates regret minimization and49
utility maximization by means of latent classes.1 First, we empirically study the determinants for50
1Note that the conventional approach to applying latent class models in transportation is to assume that classes differ
in terms of preference intensities, in the form of estimable parameters which differ between preference classes (e.g
Olaru et al., 45; Beck et al., 2013; Vij et al., 2013).
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both choice behaviours by means of a membership function explaining membership probability to51
both choice behaviours. Second, we overlay a characterization of random preference heterogeneity52
to each specific choice behaviour. By doing so we achieve the desirable outcome of simultaneously53
accounting for both taste and choice behaviour heterogeneity in one single model that combines a54
discrete mixing process (across regret and utility classes) and a continuous mixing process (across55
coefficient values within each behavioural class). Third, we evaluate the user benefits or welfare56
effects associated with selected public programs (in particular: traffic calming schemes) under the57
proposed model. More specifically, we suggest an estimation of the monetary value predicted to58
obtain a fifty percent support of a proposed traffic calming scheme.59
For the purpose of illustration of this method we explore choice data from a classic experiment60
on traffic calming schemes conducted in the year 2000. See Barbosa et al. (2000) for a relevant61
previous study on traffic calming which was published in this journal; while that paper focuses62
on the impact of traffic calming on speed profiles, our study concerns preferences for different63
alternative specifications of such schemes. We note that the data used here were not previously64
used except for the technical report to the funding agency, while results from its twin study based65
on other Northern England locations was published in 2002 (Garrod et al., 2002). The population66
under study were those that at the time resided in Sherburn in Elmet, a rural town in Northern67
England which is crossed by trunk road traffic. Residents of these types of rural towns typically68
suffer the negative consequences from through traffic and enjoy little of the benefits since most69
vehicles tend not to stop in town. Long-haul freight transport on wheels across England and70
Scotland often induces heavy vehicle traffic along these trunk roads and as a consequence they71
exacerbate the production of negative local externality. Specifically the experiment concerned72
separate features of a traffic calming project designed to reduce the negative consequences for73
residents of the traffic through the town, such as excessive speed, community severance and noise.74
Importantly, we wish to state up front that our aim is not to compare the RR and RU paradigm.75
Many recent papers have provided such comparisons, and the over-all result is becoming increas-76
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ingly clear. Chorus et al. (working paper) present a critical overview of more than forty empirical77
comparisons between RR and RU: differences in model fit between the RR and RU model are gen-78
erally small but statistically significant at conventional sample sizes, the RR model outperforming79
linear-additive RU formulations in about 50% of cases. Also differences in predictions for out of80
sample performance are found to be small. Interestingly, though, differences in terms of elastic-81
ities and in terms of choice probabilities for individual choice situations can be quite large. As a82
consequence, the two model types can lead to markedly different policy implications Chorus et al.83
(working paper). This paper does not aim to provide yet another comparison of the two model84
types. Rather, we wish to show how the two behavioural assumptions can be used jointly in an85
integrated model, while allowing for heterogeneity within each behaviour, regret or utility based.86
In the rest of the paper we proceed by first discussing in Section 2 the main features of the two87
choice behaviours. We develop the discussion in relation to the existing literature and describe the88
model with which we propose to investigate the discrete mixing of the two behaviours, focussing89
on our effort to (i) explore the determinants of membership into the two behavioural classes, and90
(ii) allow for taste heterogeneity within behavioural classes. Finally, we describe how to derive91
welfare measures about the provision of a local public good from our modelling approach.92
The survey and data we use to empirically illustrate the approach are presented and discussed93
in Section 3 and the results of our estimations are in Section 4. In Section 5 we illustrate the94
welfare effects evaluations associated with selected public programs and Section 6 summarizes95
our findings and reports our conclusions.96
2. Methods97
From the perspective of the researcher who intends to account for different choice behaviours98
(or paradigms2) by using PDP models and including the self-evident issue of heterogeneous taste99
across individuals within these processes, three steps are required. The first step involves the100
2In this paper we use the terms ‘choice paradigms’, ‘decision processes, ‘choice behaviour’ interchangeably.
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definition of probabilistic choice models conditional on the choice paradigms giving rise to the101
observed choice processes. This step explains how choice is conducted if the subject is acting102
according to each of the choice paradigms, up to a given probability. Well established models103
exist for the practical implementation of this step when subjects are acting under utility maximiza-104
tion. These are not as common for regret minimization, despite its implementation only requires105
minimal adaptation. The second step deals with the probabilistic allocation of subjects to specific106
paradigms and hence decision processes. This step simply allocate the subject with a given de-107
gree of probability to each of the choice paradigms on the basis of the observed choice sequence.108
We implement this here using the conventional finite mixing between processes by means of a109
behavioural latent class approach. Finite mixing of decision processes is a well-established ap-110
proach to model latent higher order choice behaviours based on, for example, attribute processing,111
elimination by aspect and other behavioural paradigms. This approach is probabilistic and can be112
contrasted with the deterministic allocation of respondents to different utility specifications based113
on respondents self-reports (Hensher et al., 2005; Campbell et al., 2008). The third and final step,114
which is novel in this context and is required for realism, is allowing for preference heterogeneity115
across respondents within choice behaviours. This is addressed here by introducing continuous116
mixing of preferences within latent groups (Bujosa et al., 2010; Hensher et al., 2012a; Boeri,117
2011). In what follows, we tackle in some detail each of these steps.118
2.1. Choice modeling under Random Utility Maximization119
The aim of this section is to formally describe a model of choice for the process followed by120
an individual in choosing her favourite traffic calming alternative i from a set of j ∈ J mutually121
exclusive alternatives offered in each choice task of our experiment. Typically, choice experiments122
use a balanced panel of T observed choices. So, each respondent is given T such choice tasks to123
perform. In our empirical case we will consider the situation in which a subject n has to choose124
between J traffic calming alternatives, in a repeated sequence of T choice tasks, each of which is125
denoted by t ∈ T and selects the favourite alternative by utility (Unit) maximizing. According to the126
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conventional RU maximization (henceforth RU) approach (Thurstone, 1927; Manski, 1977), re-127
spondents are thought of as selecting the alternative that maximizes their (expected) utility. Only a128
component of utility—the indirect utility—is observable to researchers and can hence be described129
by observable attributes. Therefore, from the analyst’s perspective the focus is placed on the indi-130
rect component of utility, V(β, xnit), that each alternative i brings to the respondent n in choice task131
t. The total utility of each alternative includes a random component, and it is represented by the132
function:133
Unit = V (β, xnit) + nit, (1)
where xnit is a vector of k ∈ K attribute levels and dummy variables describing the alternatives,134
β is a vector of utility coefficients to be estimated and  is the unobservable and idiosyncratic (or135
indirect) component of total utility, which is assumed to be randomly distributed according to an136
i.i.d. Gumbel process.137
Given the utility function of equation (1) and the associated assumptions on the error term, the138
probability for individual n of choosing alternative i over any other alternative j in the choice set t139
is represented by a RU - multinomial logit (RU-MNL) model McFadden (1974) is:140
PrRUnit =
eβ
′xnit
J∑
j=1
eβ′xn jt
. (2)
This is the very familiar logit probability of choice that McFadden (1974) showed to be consistent141
with a choice process guided by utility maximization.142
2.2. Choice modeling under Random Regret Minimization143
A model of probabilistic choice under RR minimization (henceforth RR) was implemented as144
a modification of equation (2) in transportation by Chorus (2010).145
In our context the RR approach postulates that, when choosing between alternatives, decision146
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makers select the traffic calming scenario that minimizes anticipated regret as represented by the147
alternatives in each choice task. Conceptually, the level of total anticipated regret that is associated148
with each alternative i is composed of two parts, similarly to what described above for the utility149
maximization approach. There is a systematic or observable part of regret, and an unobservable150
idiosyncratic component, which is assumed to behave in a stochastic fashion.151
The ‘systematic’ component of regret associated with respondent n choosing alternative i in152
choice occasion t can be written as a function of the departures from the levels of each of the153
m attributes describing the traffic scenario i and the levels of corresponding attributes used in all154
other scenario descriptions j , i:155
Rnit =
∑
j,i
∑
m=1...M
ln
(
1 + exp(θmδi j)
)
, where δi j = xn jmt − xnimt. (3)
By inspection of equation 3 one can identify the crucial difference between RR and linear-additive156
RU models: RR postulates that bilateral comparisons with all other alternatives in the choice set157
have an influence on the regret associated with a considered alternative. As discussed in greater158
detail in many of the papers on RR cited in the introduction, this dependency of choice probability159
on attribute-levels of competing alternatives causes the RR model to exhibit semi-compensatory160
behaviour and choice set composition (or context) effects.3161
Note that the determinants of the above systematic regret measure are observed by the re-162
searcher, but the idiosyncratic component εnit is not. Assuming that −εnit is additive to the observ-163
able component Rnit and distributed i.i.d. Gumbel leads to a logit choice probability based on total164
anticipated regret. This represents the random component of anticipated regret unobservable to165
the analyst. Once combined with the systematic component of regret denoted by Rnit, this gives166
total random anticipated regret:167
3See Chorus (2010) for a complete derivation and description of the model, and see Chorus and Bierlaire (2013) for a
description and empirical analysis of how RR captures a context effect known as the compromise effect.
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R˜nit = Rnit + εnit =
∑
j,i
∑
m=1...M
ln
(
1 + eθmδi j
)
+ εnit (4)
Given the systematic regret described in equation (3), and acknowledging that minimization of168
regret is mathematically equivalent to maximizing the negative of the regret, the probability for in-169
dividual n of choosing alternative i over any other alternative j in the choice set can be represented170
by the well-known multinomial logit formula for the integral over a Gumbel distributed −εnit, or:171
PrRRnit =
e(−Rnit)
J∑
j=1
e(−Rn jt)
. (5)
At this point it is important to note that the notion of regret on which the RR model is built172
differs from the notion of regret in models of risky decision-making (e.g. Bell, 1982; Loomes173
and Sugden, 1982; Quiggin, 1994; Starmer, 2000; Loomes, 2010; Bleichrodt et al., 2010; Baillon174
et al., 2013). That is, RR models postulate that regret may also exist when the performance of175
choice alternatives (as described by attribute levels) is fully known by the decision-maker (i.e.,176
in the absence of risk or uncertainty). In RR models regret arises from the situation where a177
decision-maker has to put up with non-ideal performance on some attributes, in order to achieve a178
good performance on others. In other words, it is the trade-off between different attributes which179
causes regret. In contrast, models of risky choice that are built on the notion of regret (such as180
Regret Theory) assume that regret is caused by the fact that the decision-maker only knows the181
performance of alternatives up to a probability. Therefore an alternative that performs worse than182
another on certain attributes might be chosen. Regret Theory, related theories and models of risky183
choice postulate that without uncertainty or risk there can be no regret. This is a fundamental184
contrast with the behavioural premises underlying RR. Nonetheless, what the two paradigms have185
in common is the notion that choices are (co-)determined by the wish of the decision-maker to186
avoid the situation where one or more non-chosen alternatives outperform at least in some respect187
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the selected one: it is the comparison-aspect, and the focus on negative outcomes, which is the188
commonality between RR minimization models and Regret Theory.189
Before moving to our description of how we model choice under co-existence of RU and RR190
heuristics in the same population, it is useful to discuss to what extent the two paradigms actually191
result in different behaviours (choice probabilities for alternatives in choice tasks).192
This question can be answered along two lines: a first approach is using synthetic data, where193
the same parameters are used for predicting RU and RR choice probabilities. See for example194
Chorus (2010) for this approach. However, since in reality the two paradigms are usually found195
to result in different parameters (for example: the magnitude of RR parameters decreases as the196
choice set gets bigger, due to the summation of strictly positive terms in the regret function), the197
usefulness of this numerical approach, which uses the same set of parameters, is limited.198
Various papers have explored to what extent choice probabilities generated by estimates from199
the two models differ. To cite one example, Chorus et al. (2013) analysed preferences of com-200
pany car users in terms of alternative fuel vehicles. Despite that the estimated RU and RR models201
achieved a very similar fit with the data, when both models were used to predict market shares of202
different alternatives in a hold-out sample, differences between RU and RR in terms of predicted203
choice probabilities were often large: in 26% of the cases the difference between the choice prob-204
abilities predicted by RR and RU was larger than 5 percentage points and in about 4% of the cases205
it was 10 percentage points or more. In about 7% of choice situations, the RR and RU model206
identified different car-types as the winner in their choice set.207
2.3. Finite mixing of choice behaviours208
Given that respondents to our survey can choose according to either a RU or a RR paradigm, we209
assume that within any given sample of respondents, we observe a mixture of panels of t observed210
choices. Each of the total n panels can be assigned—up to a probability—to one of the two latent211
choice-behaviour groups. One group produces responses by systematically engaging in a choice212
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behaviour more consistent with RU, while the other appears more consistent with RR. We hence213
propose below a discrete mixing model between the two behavioural classes.214
As mentioned in the introduction, most previous studies estimate two separate MNL models,215
one for RR and one for RU, and then proceed to compare the two models. In this study we follow216
Hess et al. (2012) and use a behavioural latent class approach. This approach is extended here217
to investigate the determinants of class—and hence of choice behaviour. Specific correlations218
between measurable socio-economic co-variates and types of choice behaviour are desirable for219
validating the estimation results.220
To investigate the latent mixture of decision processes we employ the LC modeling approach.221
This falls under the broader category of Mixed Logit models McFadden and Train (2000) and it is222
characterised by a discrete as opposed to continuous mixture of choice probabilities, which takes223
place over a finite number of homogeneous groups (classes). Each of these internally displays224
homogeneous choice behaviour. The mixing distributions f (β) and g(θ) are therefore discrete225
with the random parameter vectors β and θ taking on a finite set of distinct values.226
In the traditional RU specification of the LC choice model with C classes, the probability of227
observing a sequence of Tn choices by respondent n is based on a conventional RU framework of228
the conditional logit model (equation 1). Conditional on being in class c ∈ C, and therefore using229
coefficient vector βc, the probability of a choice sequence is defined as:230
Pr (yn|c) =
Tn∏
t=1
e(Vnit)
J∑
j=1
e(Vn jt)
=
Tn∏
t=1
e(β
′
cxnit)
J∑
j=1
e(β
′
cxn jt)
. (6)
Membership probabilities for each latent class c are defined according to a multinomial logit pro-231
cess as:232
pic =
eαc+γ
′
czn
C∑
c=1
eαc+γ′czn
, (7)
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where zn is a vector of co-variates characterizing respondent n, and γ is the vector of associated233
parameters subject to estimation, while αc is a class-specific constant. In estimation, for identifi-234
cation purposes only C − 1 set of coefficients can be independently identified. For one arbitrary235
class c the vector αc;γc = 0, so that for this c class e0 = 1 and its class membership probability is:236
pic =
1 + C−1∑
c=1
eαc+γ
′
czn
−1 , (8)
The unconditional probability of a sequence of choices can be derived by taking the expectation237
over all the C classes:238
Pr (yn) =
C∑
c=1
pic
Tn∏
t=1
e(β
′
cxnit)
J∑
j=1
e(β
′
cxn jt)
. (9)
The above equation represents the choice probability as described by a LC model within the RU
framework. Since our objective is to consider the contribution of choices conducted under both the
RU the RR frameworks, it is necessary to extend equation (9) to account for the RR minimization.
This can be achieved by defining a two class LC model in which the choice probability within
each class—Pr (yn|c)—is defined by one of the two choice paradigms under consideration (i.e. RU
from equation 2 and RR from equation 5). Putting together the two sources of choice behaviour
with their respective membership probabilities we obtain the following unconditional probability
for a sequence of T observed choice responses:
Pr (yn) = piV
Tn∏
t=1
PrRUnit + piR
Tn∏
t=1
PrRRnit , (10)
where 0 ≤ piV ≤ 1 and piR = (1− piV) are the membership probabilities for the RU class and the RR239
class, respectively. The first term in equation (10) is described by a RU-MNL and the second term240
is determined by a RR-MNL (see equations 1–5).241
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2.4. Taste heterogeneity within choice behaviours242
Within each behavioural class it is reasonable to expect a degree of heterogeneity of taste.243
Apart from extending this model to the investigation of determinants of class membership, we244
also allow for taste heterogeneity within each class. Since these are behavioural classes, and245
not taste heterogeneity classes, ignoring unobserved taste heterogeneity would imply a potential246
specification bias as we know from the overwhelming evidence reported in the literature that such247
heterogeneity is likely to be present in most choice data.248
In order to extend equation (10) to a specification accounting for such a pervasive phenomenon249
we also estimate a model which addresses continuous heterogeneity of taste across respondents250
within the same choice paradigm class (LC-RPL model) (Bujosa et al., 2010; Hensher et al.,251
2012b; Hess et al., 2012). The resulting unconditional choice probability can be described by252
the following random parameter logit model:253
Pr (yn) = piV
∫
β
Tn∏
t=1
PrRUnit f (β) dβ + piR
∫
θ
Tn∏
t=1
PrRRnit g (θ) dθ, (11)
in this model the first class is described by a RU-RPL and the second class is based on a RR-254
RPL. Normal distributions are assumed for all random parameters in each class, therefore in f (β),255
β ∼ N(µ, σ2), and g (θ), θ ∼ N(ξ, ω2). These probability integrals do not have close-form and they256
are simulated in estimation.257
2.5. Welfare measures in the mixture paradigm model258
While the derivation of welfare measures from RU models is well known and underpins much259
of the non-market literature based on this paradigm, the use of the regret minimization approach260
poses specific challenges. In the RR paradigm there is no immediate close-form solution for mi-261
croeconomic concepts such as compensating or equivalent variation, nor is there one for consumer262
surplus. The logsum can be computed, but unlike in the RU case (Train, 2009), the exact microe-263
conomic meaning of this value is unclear (Chorus, 2012; Boeri et al., 2012a). It is nevertheless264
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possible to use the coefficient estimates to carry out some sample-based simulations to find the265
predicted proportion of the sample that would support a given policy scenario at a given cost. In266
our local public good provision context of a traffic calming scheme, the quantity of interest is the267
maximum amount that still triggers majority support by residents for a given scheme (e.g. 50 per-268
cent). This would be an accurate model for the outcome of a local referendum poll, for example.269
We propose this amount as an estimate of the welfare change associated with a given proposal and270
specific to those adopting that choice paradigm.4271
In practice this involves the computation of posterior coefficients for each individual respon-272
dent in the sample, conditional on the pattern of observed choices, which can be achieved by273
applying Bayes’ theorem to derive the expected posterior values of individual parameters. This274
is a well-established approach in the RU framework (Huber and Train, 2001; von Haefen, 2003;275
Scarpa and Thiene, 2005; Greene et al., 2005; Scarpa et al., 2007; Train, 2009), but it requires276
adjustment in our mixture models of choice behaviour. In fact, for each choice paradigm (see277
equations 2 and 5) we compute the conditional parameters following the method described by278
Scarpa and Thiene (2005). Knowing the estimated parameters under each choice paradigm and279
the membership probability, the expected value of parameters for each respondent given the ob-280
served sequence of choices can be approximated by simulation as follows:281
Eˆ[βnm] =
1
Q
Q∑
t=1
βqmPr (β
q; θq|yn, piV)
1
QPr (β
q; θq|yn, piV)
(12)
Eˆ[θnm] =
1
Q
Q∑
r=1
θqmPr (β
q; θq|yn, piV)
1
QPr (β
q; θq|yn, piV)
, (13)
where q denotes the generic draw of a random coefficient, and Q the total number of draws, and282
4Importantly, as well as the RR paradigm, this estimate is conditional on the specific set of alternative scenarios
against which it is evaluated. This because, as seen in equation 3 all alternatives contribute to the computation of the
observed anticipated regret.
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Pr (βq; θq|yn, piV) is the logit probability in equation 11 conditional on the individual set of re-283
sponses. Once we know the individual posterior parameters for each choice paradigm conditional284
to the membership probability, it is possible to apply for each respondent an adapted version of285
the formula used by Scarpa and Thiene (2005) for deriving conditional individual parameters from286
latent class models. At this point, we only need to compute the individual class membership prob-287
ability, which can be obtained as a function of the parameters retrieved in equation (12) and (13)288
and the set of observed sequence of T choices by respondent n, means of the Bayes formula using289
the ‘plug-in’ estimator:290
pˆinV =
piV
Tn∏
t=1
P̂r
RU
nit
piV
Tn∏
t=1
P̂r
RU
nit + piR
Tn∏
t=1
P̂r
RR
nit
, (14)
pˆinR = 1 − pˆinV , (15)
where P̂r
RU
nit is the logit for utility maximisers given the conditional individual posterior coefficients291
computed in equation (12) and P̂r
RR
nit is that for the regret minimizers, obtained using equation (13).292
A series of comparisons in which the baselines are kept identical for all but a single attribute293
can be useful to determine the median in the sample for marginal cost of acceptance for a traffic294
calming strategy characterised by a given attribute change. We compute these quantities for a295
variety of competing alternatives schemes and discuss them in the results section. Note that given296
the mode of computation of RR it is important to have the same number of alternatives that were297
observed by respondents in the choice tasks of the actual survey of this study.298
3. The Survey and the Sample299
As an empirical illustration of the approach we use data from a choice experiment designed300
to elicit preferences for traffic calming projects amongst residents of a rural town in Northern301
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England, namely Sherburn-in-Elmet.302
The factors used in the experiment were three traffic calming outcomes, namely (i) reduced303
noise level from road traffic (Noise); (ii) an effective speed limit (Speed); (iii) reduced length304
of waiting time for pedestrians to cross the road (Wait); and two other factors: (iv) the overall305
appearance of the Traffic Calming scheme (Beauty); and (v) the annual cost per household of the306
scheme in terms of increased local taxation in the form of council rates (Cost).307
In each choice task, respondents were offered two profiles based on this attribute set plus308
one describing the status quo, and they were asked to choose the one that they most preferred.309
The choice experiment proposed eight choice tasks to each respondent using a randomised set of310
profiles from the full factorial.311
In order to reduce the complexity of the design of the choice experiment only a limited range312
of attribute levels were used to construct the profiles. Three levels of annual cost (10, 20 or 30)313
were used to explore local households Willingness to pay (WTP) for Traffic calming scheme, along314
with two levels (20 or 30 mph) for Speed and three levels (60, 70 or 80dB) for Noise. The aesthetic315
component of the Traffic calming layout could be either ‘basic’ or ‘improved’, and waiting time316
for crossing the road could be either short (1 minute) or long (3 minutes).317
Interviews were conducted in the respondents homes by trained interviewers. Respondents318
were asked to listen to tape recordings of traffic noise played at each of the three decibel levels.319
Respondents were advised that sounds levels represented noise conditions at the curb of the main320
road. The alternative approach of using a verbal representations of decibel levels associated with321
traffic noise is clearly inferior to that of exposing respondents to traffic noise recordings played at322
the actual noise levels specified. A further advantage of this approach is that the use of actual road323
noise better describes the non-linear increase in volume associated with 10 unit increases on the324
logarithmic decibel scale.5 Finally, the aesthetic effects associated with the basic and improved325
5The often used decibel is one tenth of a ‘Bel’; the ladder is a seldom-used unit named in honor of Alexander Graham
Bell.
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design were illustrated by means of pictures of existing traffic calming schemes.326
Prior to the implementation of the surveys physical measurements of noise, speed, and poten-327
tial severance, expressed as average time to cross the trunk-road in the town centre, were taken328
so as to objectively establish the prevailing status quo conditions. A combination of focus groups329
and informal interviews with local people were also carried out to investigate the negative impacts330
of traffic at each site. These investigations were also used to inform questionnaire design. While331
many issues were discussed, those worth mentioning include the phrasing employed to describe332
Effective Speed Limits, along with the choice of payment vehicle and range of values used on the333
profiles.334
As a means of improving prediction when modeling choice-decisions, interviewers recorded335
the approximate distance from each respondents dwelling to the main road (Category 1 - less than336
50 yards; Category 2 - between 50 and 100 yards; Category3 - between 100 and 200 yards; and337
Category 4 over 200 yards). Interviewers also noted whether or not the road (and potentially any338
future traffic calming) was visible from the house, and whether or not road noise could be heard339
from inside the house. These observations were used to generate the following variables used in340
the definition of the membership probabilities: Dist (1, 2, 3 and 4), Visible (0-1) and Audible (0-1).341
4. Results and discussion342
4.1. Estimation343
A total of 407 usable interviews were carried out, generating 3, 256 responses for the choice344
experiments. Four models specifications were estimated on this sample: two MNL models, one for345
each choice paradigm, labeled respectively RU-MNL and RR-MNL. Next, we estimated two LC346
models that simultaneously accounted for the two choice paradigms. The first latent class model347
(LC-MNL) only allowed for the panel nature of the model and for the two decision paradigms,348
but ignored preference heterogeneity within each behavioural class. In essence this model is a dis-349
crete mixture of two multinomial logits, one built according to the conventional RU and the other350
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according to the RR. The second LC specification (LC-RPL), instead, also allows for continuous351
preference heterogeneity on top of the discrete mixing of the choice paradigms. This assumes all352
taste distributions are independently distributed normal, while the cost parameter was kept fixed353
in each class-paradigm. In essence this latter model is a discrete mixture of two continuous logit354
mixtures, one referring to the conventional RU and the other to the RR.355
All models were estimated by (simulated) maximum likelihood procedures using Python Bio-356
geme, which is a recent and more flexible development of the software Biogeme (see Bierlaire,357
2003, 2009). In order to deal with the problem of local maxima, which frequently plagues latent358
class models, we used the CFSQP algorithm (Lawrence et al., 1997) and we run the estimations359
between 100 and 200 times (depending on the model) beginning iterations from random start-360
ing values and retaining those results that maximized the sample simulated log-likelihood.6 We361
estimated the LC-RPL model by simulating the log-likelihood with 1, 000 quasi-random draws362
produced with the Latin-hypercube sampling method. The interested reader is referred to Hess363
et al. (2006) for further details on simulation variance of these quasi-random draws.364
We first present the two model specifications that fit a given choice behaviour to the whole365
sample, and then move on to those specifications that consider the collection of choice sequences366
to be a discrete mixture of both choice behaviours, RU and RR, up to mixing probabilities that are367
to be estimated.368
4.2. Results for single choice paradigms369
Table 1 presents the results from the RU-MNL and the RR-MNL. Overall, the RR-MNL pro-370
vides a better fit to the data, but only by a very small measure. In terms of fit the model are hence371
equivalent.372
[Table 1 about here.]373
6The procedure was coded in ‘PERL’ and used in combination with Python Biogeme ran under Ubuntu 10.04 LTS
- the Lucid Lynx. See Boeri (2011) for a more in-depth discussion of the use of this software, which can be made
available upon request to the lead author.
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According to the RU-MNL, town residents would have a positive preference for a traffic calm-374
ing scheme characterised by shorter waiting time for pedestrians to cross the trunk-road that splits375
the town, as denoted by the positive and significant coefficient for the dummy of a shorter wait.376
They would also value positively the aesthetically improved version of the traffic calming scheme377
(Beauty), as denoted by the sign and significance of the coefficient for the respective dummy378
variable.379
On the other hand, traffic calming schemes characterised by high level of noise and those that380
allow a high effective speed limit would yield a lower utility for residents than those with low381
speed and noise levels, as denoted by the negative and significant coefficients for these variables.382
The coefficient associated with the scheme’s cost—expressed as an increased in local rates—is383
negative and highly significant, as expected. All coefficient estimates have expected signs.384
Comparing the individual coefficient estimates from the RU-MNL to those from the RR-MNL385
model we find little difference in terms of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients of386
the various attributes. We also note that the coefficient estimates from the RR-MNL show the same387
signs as those in the RU-MNL.388
However, we emphasize that the interpretation of the coefficient estimates from the two models389
is not directly comparable, in the sense that θ measure the potential regret that is caused by a one390
unit change of the corresponding attribute (when comparing a considered alternative with another391
alternative). The word ‘potential’ is important here, as the actual change of regret depends on the392
relative performance of the alternatives in terms of their attributes: if a considered alternative has393
a (very) strong initial performance on the attribute, relative to a competing alternative, then a one394
unit change in the attribute causes only small differences in regret. In contrast, when a considered395
alternative has a (very) poor initial performance on the attribute, relative to a competing alternative,396
then a one unit change in the attribute causes large differences in regret. These context-dependent397
preferences—which lead to semi-compensatory behaviour—are a direct result of the convexity of398
the regret function presented in equation 3. Note, however, that ratios of RR-parameters, just like399
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their RU-counterparts, can be compared in the sense that both give an indication of the relative400
importance of the attributes (disregarding any scale difference of attributes). Further discussion401
about the interpretation of RR-parameters can be found in Chorus (2010) and other papers cited in402
the introduction of this paper.403
[Figure 1 about here.]404
The coefficient for a reduced waiting time for pedestrians to cross the trunk-road is positive405
and significant in both models. But the meaning differs. This sign in the RR model suggests that406
regret increases when a non-chosen alternative characterised by a shorter waiting time is available407
in the choice set. This because regret is computed on the basis of the waiting time for pedestrians408
to cross the road at the chosen alternative. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the negative409
coefficient for the Noise level suggests that regret decreases when the level of noise level for the410
non-chosen alternative is higher and, as a result, this alternative is less attractive when compared411
to the chosen alternative with lower noise level.412
As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, to help the reader visualise the differences between413
β and θ we include Figure 1 in which we plot the ratios between each attribute coefficient and the414
tax coefficient estimated from the MNL model. On the horizontal axis we plot ratios from RU415
estimates and the ratios based on RR choice paradigm are on the vertical axis. This allows for a416
visual comparison across models estimates. The figure shows that Beauty and Wait are estimated417
as relatively more important for RR, while Speed and Noise for RU.418
Finally, we notice that in both RU-MNL and RR-MNL the coefficient for the status-quo spe-419
cific constant, which refers to the current situation, is positive and highly significant. This suggests420
that respondents tend to prefer the status quo and/or they are reluctant to implement any of the pro-421
posed traffic calming schemes. This status-quo bias is often observed in similar empirical studies422
(Scarpa et al., 2005; Boxall et al., 2009; Marsh et al., 2011; Hartman et al., 1991) and has been423
the subject of several theoretical investigations (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Hartman et al.,424
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1991; Michael, 2004). In essence the two models do not display major differences in terms of their425
qualitative description of preferences for attributes.426
4.3. Results for mixture of choice paradigms427
Estimates for the two models with mixtures for both the LC-MNL and LC-RPL models are428
presented in Table 2. In terms of model fit, as demonstrated by the relative values of the informa-429
tion criteria, the LC-MNL model outperforms the MNL models and in turn the LC-RPL improves430
the fit to the data even further, as one would expect. This corroborates the hypothesis that taste431
heterogeneity as well as paradigm heterogeneity co-exist in our sample of choices.432
[Table 2 about here.]433
Some of the coefficient estimates signs for the LC-MNL model are discordant across be-434
havioural classes. For example, Noise and Speed and SQ have different signs across classes.435
Beauty and Wait, instead, are positive in both classes, while Tax is negative in both classes. Re-436
spondents members of the RR-class emerge as being inclined to prefer the current situation, while437
respondents in the RU-class do not. This apparent association between regret minimization be-438
haviour and an inclination to choose the status quo option is in line with previous empirical results439
obtained in the field of (consumer) psychology (Ritov and Baron, 1995; Ordo´n˜ez et al., 1999;440
Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007).441
Another interesting difference between the two classes is that the coefficient for the effective442
speed limit is negative for the class characterised by utility maximization and positive but statisti-443
cally insignificant for the class focused on regret minimization. This suggests that for respondents444
who choose by minimizing their regret speed is not as important as for those who choose max-445
imising their utility.446
Overall the LC-MNL results corroborates the existence of an articulated set of differences,447
which remain unobserved in the results of the MNL models that imposed common behavioural448
assumptions across all respondents in the sample.449
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The LC-RPL model, which incorporates heterogeneity in preference within each class, pro-450
duces two effects worth noting. The first is a sign reversal in the mean value of the coefficient for451
speed in the RU class, which is negative when the coefficient is not random, and shows positive452
mean and a large variance in the LC-RPL. A large variance is also found in the RR class. Taken453
jointly these results provide strong evidence of great variability in the values of the utility weights454
assigned to speed across respondents. In both the RU and RR classes there is strong polarization455
around zero, in the sense that the size of the spread parameter relative to that of the mean implies456
a near-equal split between positive and negative coefficient values in the population. Since ran-457
domness has been modelled by imposing each random coefficient to take a normal distribution it458
is immediate to compute the implied fractions of respondents with negative weighted coefficients459
for both classes. For the RR class this is Φ(ξˆ = 0.030, ωˆ = 0.102) = 0.384, while for the RU class460
this is Φ(µˆ = 0.011, σˆ = 0.157) = 0.472. The complements of 0.616 for RR and of 0.528 for RU461
refer to the fractions with positive values. These polarised views on effective speed limits are not462
uncommon. It had previously emerged as such in the focus groups conducted in the phase of the463
survey instrument design. While most residents welcome effective speed reduction on the grounds464
of safety, a good fraction of them (mostly made up by drivers) see traffic calming schemes—and465
especially speed restriction effects—as a nuisance.466
We note that the apparent anomaly of a positive coefficient on noise—which emerged in the467
RU class for the LC-MNL—disappears in the LC-RPL, in which both RU and RR classes have the468
expected negative mean, with relatively low variance estimate.469
All random coefficients for the RU-class and all but Beauty for the RR-class have significant470
estimates for standard deviations, which imply a significant presence of heterogeneity across indi-471
viduals. In conclusion, preference heterogeneity appears to be an important factor in both choice472
behaviour classes. The specification that incorporates both sources of heterogeneity in the form of473
choice behaviour, as well as taste variation, fits the data significantly better than the specification474
that allows only for heterogeneity in choice behaviour. While this is expected, both LC models475
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provide the analyst with a much richer set of behavioural information, for the interpretation and476
validation of which we now turn our attention to the role of paradigm determinants.477
To illustrate, in Figure 2 we plot the values obtained from the RU class on the horizontal axis478
and the values obtained from RR class on the vertical. Figure 2(a) plots values from the LC-MNL479
model, while Figure 2(b) contains values from the LC-RPL model with the standard errors of the480
distributions around the mean values. Note how the latter shows a pattern similar to that of the 2481
MNL estimates.482
[Figure 2 about here.]483
4.4. Determinants of choice paradigms484
The estimates of the coefficients determining class membership probabilities afford the analyst485
an understanding of what systematically correlates with each of the two choice paradigms. The486
membership probability for the class with RU choice behaviour are as in equation (7). The average487
of the individual-specific membership probabilities gives a 57.3 percent probability of belonging to488
the RU class according to the LC-MNL model and 56.1 percent according to the LC-RPL model.489
So, the RU paradigm dominates in both models, but not by far.490
The coefficient estimates for selected combinations of socio-economic determinants of class491
membership are presented in table 3 for both LC models, and placed side by side to ease compar-492
ison. These refer to determinants of class membership probabilities for the RU-class using as a493
baseline a value of zero (necessary for identification) for the membership to the RR-class.494
The negative and significant ASC indicates a marginal propensity for the baseline group (which495
includes respondents who do not drive, can neither see nor hear the road and have no school age496
Kids) to belong to the RR class. All other coefficients have positive signs and hence indicate a497
propensity to belong to the RU class. Three of these (drivers-to-work, audible and school aged498
kids) are statistically significant. In the LC-RPL mode, which accounts for within class unobserved499
preference variation across respondents, the membership coefficient for the constant associated500
with the baseline group, driver-work, and audible are higher in both value and significance.501
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[Table 3 about here.]502
In the three blocks of the lower part of table 3 we report the sample average of the individ-503
ual membership probabilities and the membership probability computed for each combination of504
socio-economic determinants. These are separated in three blocks of eight each. Block A reports505
the case for respondents who mostly drive for work, block B reports the case of respondents who506
mostly drive for hobby, while block C reports the predicted probabilities of membership for those507
who do not drive regularly.508
We notice that having to drive regularly for work or hobby—values in rows A1 and B1—509
increases the probability of membership to the RU class. More so for those having to drive for510
work (nearly 20% more likely to be in the RU class). The second largest impact on RU membership511
is predicted to be that of having school-age kids or living in a location from which the traffic on512
the trunk road is audible, as can be seen comparing the pairs of values in A1, A6 and B1, B6 and513
C1,C6 and those in the pairs A1, A8 and B1, B8 and C1,C8.514
In general, residents who drive, have children to drive to school and for whom the main road515
is visible or audible have high probability of membership to the RU-class. On the other hand,516
respondents who do not drive or drive only for leisure, have no school-age children to drive to517
school or who cannot either see or hear the main road from the place of residence are more likely518
to be assigned to the RR-class. This suggests that respondents who are familiar with the attributes519
underlying the choice context tend to adopt choice behaviour more in keeping with RU maximiza-520
tion, while respondents who are less familiar with it are more likely to adopt choice behaviour521
consistent with RR minimization. This finding appears to be in line with previous work in con-522
sumer psychology, where it has been argued that regret minimization is a particularly important523
determinant of decision making when decision-makers find it difficult to make the right decision524
(Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2007) perhaps for lack of experience. In our case results suggests that525
the more familiar a respondent is with the road (either as a driver or by proximity to it), the more526
he/she will choose maximising his/her utility without considering the performances of the non-527
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chosen options. Other respondents are more inclined to choose options by minimising their regret528
because they may be afraid that non-chosen traffic calming scheme may perform better than the529
chosen one, on the basis of one or more attributes. An alternative interpretation is that those who530
can avoid rush-hour traffic and use the trunk road less frequently—such as those who drive mainly531
for leisure and those who do not drive children to school—are more likely to be attracted by traffic532
calming schemes characterised by ‘in-between’ performance of the attributes compared to other533
schemes that may have a poor performance on some attributes and a good performance on other534
attributes.535
We generally observe substantive convergence across the two versions of the LC model in the536
direction and intensity of the effects of determinants of choice behaviour. Some exceptions are537
worth discussing. For example, those who drive mostly for hobby seem to be affected differently538
by whether or not they have school age kids and the road is visible from their homes. Those with539
kids and visibility are predicted as RR minimizers by the LC-RPL, but not so by the LC-MNL.540
A similar effect is noted for those with school age kids and those who do not drive who have a541
higher probability to be classified as RR minimizer by the LC-RPL model. In as much as one542
finds it plausible that respondents with school age kids are more inclined to make choices using543
regret minimization, which we find quite plausible, this result corroborates the validity of the best544
performing model, the LC-RPL.545
5. Welfare impacts of selected calming schemes546
Estimating the welfare effects of different traffic calming schemes was one of the most impor-547
tant and challenging objective of this study. Deriving welfare measure from a hybrid model that548
includes two choice paradigms as well as heterogeneity in preferences, is not straightforward. In549
this section we explain how we estimate the maximum cost that our sample of residents are willing550
to pay for a traffic calming policy when compared with alternative schemes. Assuming the scheme551
is to be voted in via a local referendum poll, the quantity of interest is the amount that at least fifty552
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percent of the residents would be willing to pay. The need of predefined alternative traffic calming553
schemes is necessary for welfare estimate derivation in the RR context. This because regret is a554
relative function of choice set composition. In our case the alternative traffic calming schemes on555
offer are compared to the current traffic situation (SQ), defined as 70db of noise, 40 Miles/h of556
speed limit and no improvements in waiting time for pedestrians to cross the road (Wait) nor in the557
overall appearance of the Traffic Calming scheme (Beauty), which is currently missing. The candi-558
date alternatives are various traffic calming schemes. These include, respectively, an improvement559
in Wait (3a) or Beauty (2a) and in both characteristics (1a) leaving the level of noise and the speed560
limit unchanged. We then compare the SQ to an improvement in Wait (3b) or Beauty (2b) and in561
both characteristics (1b) considering in all the alternatives an additional reduction of noise levels562
at the curb from 70db to 60db. Results are shown in Table 4.563
[Table 4 about here.]564
For example, the third row shows that the aesthetics of the Traffic Calming scheme are valued565
by respondents. Scheme 3a leaves all attributes unchanged and only adds Beauty to the status quo.566
When contrasted with schemes 1a, 2a and the status quo, scheme 3a is associated with a maximum567
majority value of about 3.2 pounds per respondent. At any higher amount the scheme 3a would568
fall below majority support.569
Candidate scheme 1a—in the second row of the Table 4—has a maximum majority value of570
0.6 pounds per respondent higher than scheme 3a because it also offers a reduction in waiting time571
for pedestrians to cross the road, but it is evaluated in a consideration set that includes schemes572
2a, 3a and the status quo. Finally, candidate scheme 2a isolate the effects of reduced waiting time573
and leaves all attributes unchanged. When evaluated in a consideration set including 1a, 3a and574
the status quo it is associated with a maximum majority value of 1.1 pounds per respondent. The575
examples above illustrate well the fact that the marginal effects in terms of maximum majority576
value depend on the compositions of the consideration sets. So, when regret is involved, welfare577
estimates are clearly dependent on irrelevant alternatives.578
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Moving our attention to the candidate schemes that reduce the level of noise from the road579
from 70db to 60db (rows 4,5 and 6 of Table 4), we note how these candidate schemes would be580
voted in even at a considerably higher maximum majority value (about 10 pound per respondent581
more than the first set of alternative schemes). The level of noise of the truck road seems to be the582
main cause of regret and utility for our sample of respondents.583
6. Conclusions584
Our empirical investigation of two probabilistic decision processes into separate and integrated585
models suggests that a substantial share of our sample of town residents expressed a choice pat-586
tern of traffic calming schemes that is better explained by RR minimization than RU maximization,587
although the majority provides choice patterns consistent with the latter. In terms of choice mod-588
elling, we showed how to accommodate this fraction using a discrete mixture of choice behaviours589
in line with other published analysis of the same type. This literature tries to accommodate various590
probabilistic decision processes via the identification of additional choice behaviours that might591
accompany the standard RU assumption in real data. These can either take the form of attribute592
processing (e.g. Scarpa et al., 2009; Hensher and Greene, 2010) or selective treatments of cost593
information (Campbell et al., 2012) or the form of other postulated choice behaviour paradigms,594
such as lexicography, elimination by aspect, etc. (Hess et al., 2012). Juxtaposed to this mixture of595
RU and RR choice behaviours we also accounted for the well-known issue of unobserved prefer-596
ence heterogeneity within each choice behaviour class as described in Bujosa et al. (2010); Hess597
et al. (2012) and Hensher et al. (2012a).598
Our results align with what has been found in studies applying similar choice modeling tech-599
niques, as well as with related empirical work from the field of (consumer) psychology. These600
modifications produce a better fit to the data, suggesting that the inclusion of these elements im-601
proves the realism of the mathematical models used to explain observed choice. A novel finding602
is represented by conditioning class behaviour membership on socio-economic co-variates, which603
28
are often elusive in these empirical contexts. This helps explaining the drivers of choice behaviour.604
In line with evidence reported in the literature from the field of consumer psychology, we find605
evidence corroborating the hypothesis that lack of familiarity with the choice situation (in this case,606
the traffic situation) triggers regret minimization behaviour as opposed to utility maximization607
behaviour.608
In addition, we focused on exploring the effects on the resulting specification on benefit es-609
timates. This because estimation of WTP is the purpose of many applied studies, especially in610
public economics in the context of local public good provision. Because of the dependency of611
RR measures on the entire composition of the choice set, benefit estimates in the RR framework612
are not amenable to close-form derivations. We hence computed the maximum monetary amount613
residents are willing to spend for the proposed traffic calming scheme which is still sufficiently614
low to be afforded by the majority of residents at the local council level. These benefit estimates615
are applicable to RU and RR probabilities alike and therefore to their mixtures. Benefit estimates616
are highest for the proposed reduction of noise and larger for the proposed aesthetic improvements617
than for the proposed reduction in waiting times for crossing the trunk road separating the two618
parts of town. Importantly, because of the presence of regret they are dependent also on the set of619
alternatives against which they are compared.620
We believe this empirical study moves the frontier of choice modeling towards a more realistic621
understanding of both observed choice and how to use formal models of choice for benefit estima-622
tion. The provision and funding of local public goods is often cause of heated debates in public623
policy. We are hopeful that improvements in the modeling of the sources of potential economic624
benefits for the collective can better inform this important policy arena.625
29
References626
Baillon, A., Bleichrodt, H., Cillo, A., 2013. A tailor-made test of intransitive choice, manuscript, erasmus School of627
economics, Rotterdam, Netherlands.628
Barbosa, H. M., Tight, M. R., May, A. D., 2000. A model of speed profiles for traffic calmed roads. Transportation629
Research Part A: Policy and Practice 34, 103—123.630
Beck, M. J., Rose, J. M., Hensher, D. A., 2013. Environmental attitudes and emissions charging: An example of631
policy implications for vehicle choice. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 50, 171—182.632
Bell, D., Sep. 1982. Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty. Operations Research 30 (5), 961–981.633
Bierlaire, M., 2003. BIOGEME: a free package for the estimation of discrete choice models.634
Bierlaire, M., 2009. An introductory tutorial to BIOGEME Version 1.8. Monte Verita, Ascona, Switzerland.635
Bleichrodt, H., Cillo, A., Diecidue, E., 2010. A quantitative measurement of regret theory. Management Science,636
56(1), 56 (1), 161–175.637
Boeri, M., 2011. Advances in stated preference methods: Discrete and continuous mixing distributions in logit models638
for representing variance and taste heterogeneity. Ph.D. thesis, Queen’s University of Belfast, School of Biological639
Sciences - Gibson Institute for Land, Food and the Environment.640
Boeri, M., Longo, A., Doherty, E., Hynes, S., 2012a. Site choices in recreational demand: a matter of utility maxi-641
mization or regret642
minimization? Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 1, 32–47.643
Boeri, M., Longo, A., Grisola, J., Hutchinson, W., Kee, F., 2012b. The role of regret minimization in lifestyle choices644
affecting the risk of coronary heart disease. Journal of Health Economics (0).645
Boxall, P., Adamowicz, W. L., Moon, A., 2009. Complexity in choeter ice experiments: choice of the status quo646
alternative and implications for welfare measurement. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics647
53 (4), 503–519.648
Bujosa, A., Riera, A., Hicks, R., Jul. 2010. Combining Discrete and Continuous Representations of Preference Het-649
erogeneity: A Latent Class Approach. Environmental and Resource Economics.650
Campbell, D., Hensher, D., Scarpa, R., 2012. Cost thresholds, cut-offs and sensitivities in stated choice analysis:651
identification and implications. Resource and Energy Economics 34 (3), 396–411.652
Campbell, D., Hutchinson, W., Scarpa, R., 2008. Incorporating discontinuous preferences into the analysis of discrete653
choice experiments. Environmental and Resource Economics 41, 401–417.654
Chorus, C., June 2010. A new model of Random Regret Minimization. European Journal of Transport and Infrastruc-655
ture Research, 181–196.656
30
Chorus, C., 2012. Logsums for utility-maximizers and regret-minimizers, and their relation with desirability and657
satisfaction. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46 (7), 1003–1012.658
Chorus, C., Annema, J., Mouter, N., van Wee, G., 2011. Modelling politicians preferences for road pricing policies: a659
regret-based and utilitarian perspective. Transport Policy 18 (6), 856 – 861.660
Chorus, C., Bierlaire, M., 2013. An empirical comparison of travel choice models that capture preferences for com-661
promise alternatives. To appear in Transportation accepted for publication on October 04, 2012.662
Chorus, C., Koetse, M., Hoen, A., 2013. Consumer preferences for alternative fuel vehicles: Comparing a utility663
maximization and a regret minimization model. Energy Policy 61, 901–908.664
Chorus, C., van Cranenburgh, S., Dekker, T., working paper. Random regret minimization for consumer choice mod-665
eling: Assessment of empirical evidence.666
Garrod, G. D., Scarpa, R., Willis, K. G., May 2002. Estimating the benefits of traffic calming on through routes: A667
choice experiment approach. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 36, 211–231.668
Greene, W., Hensher, D., Rose, J., 2005. Using classical simulation-based estimators to estimate individual WTP669
values. In: Scarpa, R., Alberini, A. (Eds.), Applications of simulation methods in environmental and resource670
economics. Springer Publisher, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Ch. 2, pp. 17–34.671
Hartman, R. S., Doane, M. J., Woo, C., 1991. Consumer rationality and the status-quo. The Quarterly Journal of672
Economics 106, 141–162.673
Hensher, D., Greene, W., Chorus, C., 2013. Random Regret Minimisation or Random Utility Maximisation: An674
Exploratory Analysis in the Context of Automobile Choice. Journal of Advance Transportation.675
Hensher, D., Rose, J., Greene, W., 2005. The implications on willingness to pay of respondents ignoring specific676
attributes. Transportation 32, 203–222.677
Hensher, D., Rose, J., Greene, W., 2012a. Inferring attribute non-attendance from stated choice data: implications for678
willingness to pay estimates and a warning for stated choice experiment design. Transportation, 39 (2), 235–246.679
Hensher, D. A., Collins, A. T., Greene, W. H., 2012b. Accounting for attribute non-attendance and common-metric680
aggregation in a probabilistic decision process mixed multinomial logit model: a warning on potential confounding.681
Transportation.682
Hensher, D. A., Greene, W. H., 2010. Non-attendance and dual processing of common-metric attributes in choice683
analysis: a latent class specification. Empirical Economics 39, 413–426.684
Hess, S., Stathopoulos, A., Daly, A., 2012. Allowing for heterogeneous decision rules in discrete choice models: an685
approach and four case studies. Transportation 39 (3), 565–591.686
Hess, S., Train, K., Polak, J., 2006. On the use of a modified Latin hypercube sampling (MLHS) method in the687
31
estimation of a mixed logit model for vehicle choice. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 40 (2),688
147–167.689
Huber, J., Train, K., 2001. On the similarity of classical and bayesian estimates of individual mean partworths. Mar-690
keting Letters 12, 259–269.691
Kaplan, S., Prato, C. G., 2012. The application of the random regret minimization model to drivers choice of crash692
avoidance maneuvers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 15 (6), 699 – 709.693
Lawrence, C., Zhou, J., Tits, A., 1997. User’s Guide for CFSQP Version 2.5: A C Code for Solving (Large Scale) Con-694
strained Nonlinear (Minimax) Optimization Problems, Generating Iterates Satisfying All Inequality Constraints.695
Tech. Rep. TR-94-16r1, Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, 1997.696
Loomes, G., 2010. Modeling choice and valuation in decision experiments. Psychological Review 117 (3), 902924.697
Loomes, G., Sugden, R., Dec. 1982. Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty.698
The Economic Journal 92 (368), 805.699
Manski, C., 1977. The structure of random utility models. Theory and Decision 8, 229–254.700
Marsh, D., Mkwara, L., Scarpa, R., 2011. Do respondents perceptions of the status quo matter in non-market valuation701
with choice experiments? an application to new zealand freshwater streams. Sustainability 3 (9), 1593–1615.702
McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behaviour. In: Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in703
Econometrics. Academic Press, pp. 105–142.704
McFadden, D., Train, K., 2000. Mixed MNL Models for Discrete Response. Journal of Applied Econometrics 15 (5),705
447–470.706
Michael, M., 2004. Status quo maintenance reconsidered: changing or incomplete preferences? The Economic Journal707
114 (499), F518–F535.708
Olaru, D., Smith, B., Taplin, J. H., 45. Residential location and transit-oriented development in a new rail corridor.709
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 2011, 219—237.710
Ordo´n˜ez, L. D., Benson III, L., Beach, L. R., 1999. Testing the compatibility test: How instructions, accountability and711
anticipated regret affect prechoice screening of options. Organizational behaviour and Human Decision Processes712
78, 63–80.713
Quiggin, J., Mar. 1994. Regret theory with general choice sets. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8 (2), 153–165.714
Ritov, I., Baron, J., 1995. Outcome knowledge, regret, and omission bias. Organizational behaviour and Human715
Decision Processes 64 (2), 119–127.716
Samuelson, W., Zeckhauser, R., 1988. Status-quo bias in decision-making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 24 (1),717
7–59.718
32
Scarpa, R., Campbell, D., Hutchinson, W. G., 2007. Benefit estimates for landscape improvements: sequential719
Bayesian design and respondents rationality in a choice experiment study. Land Economics 83 (4), 617–634.720
Scarpa, R., Ferrini, S., Willis, K. G., 2005. Performance of error component models for status-quo effects in choice721
experiments. In: Applications of simulation methods in environmental and resource economics. Springer, Ch. 13,722
pp. 247–274.723
Scarpa, R., Gilbride, T. J., Campbell, D., Hensher, D. A., 2009. Modelling attribute non-attendance in choice experi-724
ments for rural landscape valuation. European Review of Agricultural Economics 36 (2), 151–174.725
Scarpa, R., Thiene, M., 2005. Destination choice models for rock climbing in the northeastern alps: a latent-class726
approach based on intensity of preferences. Land Economics 81 (3), 426–444.727
Starmer, C., 2000. Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice728
under Risk. Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2), 332–382.729
Thiene, M., Boeri, M., Chorus, C., 2012. Random regret minimization: Exploration of a new choice model for730
environmental and resource economics. Environmental and Resource Economics 53 (2), 413–429.731
Thurstone, L., 1927. A law of comparative judgment. Psychological Review 34, 273–286.732
Train, K., 2009. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.733
Vij, A., Carrel, A., Walker, J. L., 2013. Incorporating the influence of latent modal preferences on travel mode choice734
behaviour,. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 54, 164—178.735
von Haefen, R. H., March 2003. Incorporating observed choice into the construction of welfare measures from random736
utility models. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 45 (2), 145–165.737
Zeelenberg, M., Pieters, R., 2007. A theory of regret regulation. Journal of Consumer Psychology 17 (1), 3–18.738
33
List of Figures739
1 RU and RR in the MNL models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35740
2 RU and RR in the 2 LC models’ specifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36741
34
Figure 1: RU and RR in the MNL models.
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(a) Ratios of parameters in the two MNL model’s specifications
35
Figure 2: RU and RR in the 2 LC models’ specifications.
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(a) Ratios of parameters in the two classes specified
in the LC-MNL model
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Table 1: Comparing RU and RR in MNL models; 3, 256 observations
RU RR
Coeff. Est. |t-rat.| Coeff. Est. |t-rat.|
βNoise −0.056 17.26 θNoise −0.028 16.95
βSpeed −0.025 4.68 θSpeed −0.012 4.59
βBeauty 0.184 3.44 θBeauty 0.097 3.60
βWait 0.124 2.35 θWait 0.067 2.52
βTax −0.529 15.19 θTax −0.262 15.64
βSq 0.351 3.29 θSq 0.421 3.99
ρ2 0.112 ρ2 0.113
L(βˆ) −4, 002.139 L(βˆ) −4, 000.909
BIC 8, 052.808 BIC 8, 050.348
AIC 8, 016.278 AIC 8, 013.819
3AIC 8, 022.278 3AIC 8, 019.819
crAIC 8, 016.485 crAIC 8, 014.025
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Table 2: Latent class RU and RR models with and without taste heterogeneity
N = 3, 256
LC-MNL LC-RPL
Coeff. Est. |t-rat.| Coeff. Est. |t-rat.|
class RU
βNoise 0.072 17.72 µNoise −0.090 11.41
σNoise 0.073 8.99
βSpeed −0.035 5.43 µSpeed 0.011 0.75
σSpeed 0.157 10.89
βBeauty 0.219 3.46 µBeauty 0.218 2.54
σBeauty 0.493 3.43
βWait 0.126 2.05 µWait 0.210 2.55
σWait 0.436 2.88
βTax −0.592 13.99 βTax −0.634 10.31
βSq −1.620 10.54 βSq −3.030 10.56
class RR
θNoise −0.011 2.17 ξNoise −0.023 2.32
ωNoise 0.038 3.11
θSpeed 0.011 1.24 ξSpeed 0.030 1.64
ωSpeed 0.102 5.88
θBeauty 0.112 1.34 ξBeauty 0.150 1.41
ωBeauty 0.240 1.19
θWait 0.106 1.29 ξWait −0.057 0.51
ωWait 0.403 2.54
θTax −0.350 6.01 θTax −0.499 5.21
θSq 1.740 5.50 θSq 2.340 4.44
ρ2 0.314 ρ2 0.362
L(βˆ) −3, 079.106 L(βˆ) −2, 853.670
BIC 6, 497.919 BIC 6, 111.753
AIC 6, 242.212 AIC 5, 807.340
3AIC 6, 284.212 3AIC 5, 857.340
crAIC 6, 291.692 crAIC 5, 890.112
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Table 3: Membership models for RU class in mixture models and membership probabilities
LC-MNL LC-RPL
Coeff. Est. |t-rat.| Coeff. Est. |t-rat.|
ASC* −1.100 4.11 −1.430 4.27
driver-work 0.959 3.08 1.130 3.25
driver-hobby 0.413 1.68 0.318 1.15
visible 0.107 0.40 0.153 0.51
audible 0.961 3.28 1.290 3.81
school age kids 0.987 3.29 0.958 2.83
Probabilities in percentage
P̂r(RU) P̂r(RR) P̂r(RU) P̂r(RR)
Average of individual-specific membership probab. 57.30 42.70 56.01 43.99
A1.driver-work 46.50 53.50 42.56 57.44
A2.driver-work + visible 49.20 50.80 46.33 53.67
A3.driver-work + visible + audible 71.60 28.40 75.82 24.18
A4.driver-work + visible + audible + school age kids 87.10 12.90 89.10 10.90
A5.driver-work + audible + school age kids 85.90 14.10 87.52 12.48
A6.driver-work + school age kids 70.00 30.00 65.88 34.12
A7.driver-work + visible + school age kids 72.20 27.80 69.23 30.77
A8.driver-work + audible 69.40 30.60 72.91 27.09
B1.driver-hobby 33.50 66.50 24.75 75.25
B2.driver-hobby + visible 35.90 64.10 27.71 72.29
B3.driver-hobby + visible + audible 59.40 40.60 58.20 41.80
B4.driver-hobby + visible + audible + school age kids 79.70 20.30 78.40 21.60
B5.driver-hobby + audible + school age kids 77.90 22.10 75.69 24.31
B6.driver-hobby + school age kids 57.40 42.60 46.16 53.84
B7.driver-hobby + visible + school age kids 60.00 40.00 49.98 50.02
B8.driver-hobby + audible 56.80 43.20 54.44 45.56
C1.ASC* 24.97 75.03 19.31 80.69
C2.not driver + visible 27.03 72.97 21.81 78.19
C3.not driver + visible + audible 49.20 50.80 50.32 49.68
C4.not driver + visible + audible + school age kids 72.21 27.79 72.53 27.47
C5.not driver + audible + school age kids 70.01 29.99 69.38 30.62
C6.not driver + school age kids 47.18 52.82 38.41 61.59
C7.not driver + visible + school age kids 49.85 50.15 42.09 57.91
C8.not driver + audible 46.53 53.47 46.51 53.49
* The baseline group is composed by respondents who do not drive and can neither see nor hear
the road and have no school age Kids.
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Table 4: Maximum costs in GBP per year to vote in candidate traffic calming schemes
Candidate scheme noise speed beauty wait Other schemes in the set Cost
1a 70 40 1 1 2a, 3a, SQ 3.8
2a 70 40 0 1 1a, 3a, SQ 1.1
3a 70 40 1 0 1a, 2a, SQ 3.2
1b 60 40 1 1 2a, 3a, SQ 13.0
2b 60 40 0 1 1a, 3a, SQ 10.5
3b 60 40 1 0 1a, 2a, SQ 11.8
SQ values 70 40 0 0
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